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BLAST FROM THE PAST? A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
BROADCAST LICENSING IN THE DIGITAL ERA 
BY CORINNE SCHWEIZER, MANUEL PUPPIS,† MATTHIAS KÜNZLER,‡  AND SAMUEL STUDER  
 
 
The advent of new broadcasting technologies has eliminated spectrum scarcity as a 
constraint on broadcasting, and with it one of the justifications for broadcast licensing. 
Have nations moved away from licensing as a form of regulation of their broadcasting 
sectors? And concomitantly, is there less opportunity to use licensing as a means of 
promoting the public interest in broadcasting? The authors address these questions 
through a comparative study of licensing requirements for terrestrial broadcasting and 
other forms of television and radio distribution in 18 Western nations.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The digitization of broadcasting in Western countries is far advanced. The majority of member states 
of the European Union (EU) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), as well as Australia 
and New Zealand, have already switched off analog television and completed the transition to digital 
television; in Canada and the United States analog television transmitters have been shut down in most 
markets. In contrast to television, analog terrestrial radio (AM and FM) still plays a central role. While 
the switchover is not imminent, the coverage of digital radio continues to extend and several countries 
are already starting to plan for the post-analog era. 
Digitization has far-reaching implications for broadcasting regulation. With spectrum scarcity no 
longer presenting a major problem, traditional market entry regulation by way of licensing of private 
broadcasting is called into question, and it becomes more challenging to commit private broadcasters 
to public interest goals in exchange for a license. Consequently, the digital switchover shakes 
broadcasting regulation to its very foundations. 
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However, few studies deal with the licensing of private broadcasting. Existing research mostly focuses 
on the situation in particular countries;1 or, if comparative, was conducted long before the digital 
switchover came within reach.2  Up-to-date large-scale comparative research focusing on current 
licensing regimes is missing so far. 
In this article we ask whether licensing of private broadcasting is still used to shape the media system 
in the digital era or whether licensing is just an irrelevant blast from the past. In order to deal with this 
question, the article examines the licensing of private broadcasting in 18 Western European and 
English-language media systems. More specifically, the comparison considers who is responsible for 
authorizing private broadcasting, whether a license is required or a notification is sufficient, how the 
process of awarding licenses is designed, which decision criteria are applied in case there is competition 
for a license, and how compliance with license conditions is evaluated. 
Results indicate that most countries, regardless of digitization, still rely heavily on licensing regimes in 
order to shape their media systems and to promote the public interest. With a few exceptions, not 
only analog terrestrial radio stations but also digital terrestrial television (e.g. DVB-T and ATCS) and 
radio stations (e.g. DAB-T and HD Radio) still require a license. Provisions for other means of 
distribution are less rigid: in half of the analyzed media systems, notifying the regulator is sufficient 
when operating a cable or satellite channel. 
In the next section, this article offers an overview of the role of licensing in broadcasting regulation 
and of existing research in order to develop a framework for comparison. After describing the 
methods employed in this study, the results of the comparison will be presented. The final section 
discusses the results. 
 
THE LICENSING OF PRIVATE BROADCASTERS 
Scarcity of Frequencies and Promotion of the Public Interest 
Whereas a regulated commercial system was in place in North America since the early days of 
broadcasting,3 public service broadcasting had a monopoly in most other Western countries up until 
                                                            
1 See for example Gunn Sara Enli and Vilde Schanke Sundet, “Strategies in Times of Regulatory Change: A Norwegian 
Case Study on the Battle for a Commercial Radio Licence,” Media, Culture & Society 29 (2007): 707-725; Thomas Streeter, 
Selling the Air: A Critique of the Policy of Commercial Broadcasting in the United States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1996); Minna Aslama, Heikki Hellman, and Tuomo Sauri, “Does Market-Entry Regulation Matter? Competition in 
Television Broadcasting and Programme Diversity in Finland, 1993-2002,” International Communication Gazette 66 (2004): 
113-132; Gregory Taylor, “Shut-Off: The Digital Television Transition in the United States and Canada,” Canadian 
Journal of Communication 35 (2010): 7-25. 
2 See for example Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, Regulating Media. The Licensing and Supervision of Broadcasting in Six Countries 
(New York: Guilford Press, 1996); Peter Humphreys, Mass Media and Media Policy in Western Europe (Manchester, UK: 
Manchester University Press, 1996); Serge Robillard, Television in Europe: Regulatory Bodies – Status, Functions, and Powers in 
35 European Countries (Luton, UK: University of Luton Press, 1995). 
3 Philip M. Napoli, Foundations of Communications Policy: Principles and Process in the Regulation of Electronic Media (Cresskill, NJ: 
Hampton Press, 2001), 66-67; Jeffrey A. Hart, Technology, Television and Competition: The Politics of Digital TV (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 20; Christopher H. Sterling, “United States of America, Continuity and 
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the 1980s. When private radio and television were allowed due to the liberalization of broadcasting 
markets,4 governments decided – as they did with many other industries5 – to regulate market entry 
by introducing a licensing system.6  
Traditionally, regulation of market entry was justified by the technical necessity of allocating scarce 
terrestrial frequencies and avoiding interference between channels both domestically and 
internationally. Consequently, frequencies are understood as public goods and they lay in the hands 
of national governments.7 Aside from these technical considerations, licensing has always been used 
to promote the public interest by committing private broadcasters to societal objectives.8 McQuail 
emphasizes that not only public service media but also commercial media should contribute to the 
public interest.9 Yet the use of the term is often vague and “the public interest standard has often 
served primarily as a rhetorical tool, used on behalf of justifying particular policy actions.”10 In a very 
general sense, “public interest” refers to “the complex of supposed informational, cultural and social 
benefits to the wider society which go beyond the immediate, particular and individual interests of 
those who communicate in public communication.”11 Buckley et al. thus argue that licenses should be 
awarded by way of a “beauty contest” as auctions are “unlikely to produce a range and diversity of 
services that meet the needs of all sections in society.”12 They specifically mention requirements that 
promote diversity of content and maintain quality, like obligations to carry news and current affairs, 
educational or cultural programming, or locally-produced shows.13 Another way to promote the public 
interest through licensing is the prevention of ownership concentration, by limiting the number of 
licenses one person or organization is allowed to hold.14   
                                                            
Change,” in Television and Public Policy: Changes and Continuity in an Era of Global Liberalization, ed. David Ward (New York: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2008), 45-46. 
4 Maria Michalis, “Thirty Years of Private Television in Europe – Trends and Key Moments,” in Private Television in 
Western Europe: Content, Markets, Policies, ed. Karen Donders, Caroline Pauwels, and Jan Loisen (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013), 38-41; Manuel Puppis, Einführung in die Medienpolitik, 2nd ed. (Konstanz, Germany: UVK, 2010), 206-
213; Humphreys, Mass Media and Media Policy in Western Europe, 159-198. 
5 Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, “The Regulation of Entry,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 117 (2002): 1-37; Leora Klappera, Luc Laeven, and Raghuram Rajan, “Entry Regulation as a 
Barrier to Entrepreneurship,” Journal of Financial Economics 82 (2006): 591-629; Shirley Svorny, “Licensing, Market Entry 
Regulation,” in Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Volume III: The Regulation of Contracts, ed. Boudewijn Bouckaert and 
Gerrit De Geest (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2000), 296-328. 
6 Matthias Künzler, Die Liberalisierung von Radio und Fernsehen. Leitbilder der Rundfunkregulierung im Ländervergleich (Konstanz, 
Germany: UVK, 2009), 49-50; Stylianos Papathanassopoulos and Ralph M. Negrine, European Media: Structures, Policies and 
Identity (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2011), 31-36. 
7 Humphreys, Mass Media and Media Policy in Western Europe, 112; Puppis, 71-72; Sterling, 46. 
8 Mike Feintuck and Mike Varney, Media Regulation, Public Interest and the Law (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2006), 74-125; Napoli, 63-69. 
9 Denis McQuail, Media Performance: Mass Communication and the Public Interest (London: Sage Publications, 1992), 3. 
10 Napoli, 94. 
11 McQuail, 3. 
12 Steve Buckley, Kreszentia Duer, Toby Mendel, and Seán Ó Siochrú, Broadcasting, Voice, and Accountability. A Public 
Interest Approach to Policy, Law, and Regulation (Washington: World Bank Group, 2008), 232. 
13 Ibid., 237-238. 
14 Michele Polo, “Regulation for Pluralism in Media Markets,” in The Economic Regulation of Broadcasting Markets: Evolving 
Technology and the Challenges for Policy, ed. Paul Seabright and Jürgen von Hagen (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), 171-172. 
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With the introduction of new distribution channels like cable networks and satellites,15 the problem of 
scarcity of frequencies lost much of its urgency. While technological development does not determine 
whether regulation in the public interest suddenly becomes unnecessary, together with political and 
economic changes the new means of distribution had far-reaching implications for broadcasting 
regulation. In Europe, satellite technology allowed private commercial stations to circumvent 
domestic regulation by “operating from the most favorable regulatory base.”16 Coupled with changing 
political ideologies as well as a demand for regulatory change by media corporations and the 
advertising industry, this led to what Dyson and Humphreys called a “competitive deregulation.”17 
More recently, digitization increased the capacity of distribution channels even more, leading to a 
multiplication of radio and television stations.18 With the increasing market penetration of digital 
stations, the analog switch-off became viable. Today, the majority of European and English-speaking 
countries have switched off analog television and completed the transition to digital television. 
Whereas analog terrestrial radio (in most countries AM and FM) still plays a central role, the coverage 
of digital radio (DAB and DAB+) continues to expand, and several countries are already starting to 
plan for the post-analog era. As with the introduction of cable and satellite broadcasting 30 years ago, 
digitization and convergence are used as arguments by governments to retreat from regulation “where 
it interferes with market development.”19 Taylor for instance shows that for Canada, due to the 
transition to digital television, traditional regulatory principles promoting the public interest were 
abandoned.20 
In sum, this short overview of broadcasting regulation emphasizes that policymakers see technological 
developments as an opportunity and prioritize industrial policy at the expense of the traditional goals 
of media policy.21 Hence, scholars argue that we are witnessing a paradigm shift in media policy from 
social and political goals to economic goals.22   
                                                            
15 Kenneth Dyson and Peter Humphreys, “Deregulating Broadcasting: The West European Experience,” European 
Journal of Political Research 17 (1989): 141; Megan Mullen, Television in the Multichannel Age: A Brief History of Cable Television 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2008). 
16 Humphreys, Mass Media and Media Policy in Western Europe, 170. 
17 Dyson and Humphreys, 142-143; Humphreys, Mass Media and Media Policy in Western Europe, 164-174. For the United 
States see Edward S. Herman and Robert W. McChesney, The Global Media: The New Missionaries of Corporate Capitalism 
(New York: Continuum, 1997). 
18 Feintuck and Varney, 40; Graham Murdock, “Digital Futures: European Television in the Age of Convergence,” in 
Television Across Europe: A Comparative Introduction, ed. Jan Wieten, Graham Murdock, and Peter Dahlgren (London: Sage 
Publications, 2000), 46; Paul Seabright and Helen Weeds, “Competition and Market Power in Broadcasting: Where Are 
the Rents?” in The Economic Regulation of Broadcasting Markets: Evolving Technology and the Challenges for Policy, ed. Paul 
Seabright and Jürgen von Hagen (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 48. 
19 Jan van Cuilenburg and Denis McQuail, “Media Policy Paradigm Shifts: Towards a New Communications Policy 
Paradigm,” European Journal of Communication 18 (2003): 198. See also David A. Levy, Europe’s Digital Revolution. Broadcasting 
Regulation, the EU and the Nation State (London: Routledge, 1999), 143. 
20 Taylor. See also David Skinner, “Television in Canada: Continuity or Change?” in Television and Public Policy: Changes and 
Continuity in an Era of Global Liberalization, ed. David Ward (New York: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2008), 7-10. 
21 Thomas Gibbons and Peter Humphreys, Audiovisual Regulation under Pressure. Comparative Cases from North America and 
Europe (London: Routledge, 2012), 4-5; David Ward, “Introduction,” in Television and Public Policy: Changes and Continuity in 
an Era of Global Liberalization, ed. David Ward (New York: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2008), x. 
22 van Cuilenburg and McQuail; Hoffmann-Riem, 340-352. 
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Yet despite these massive changes in the media landscape and calls for deregulation, terrestrial 
broadcasting still plays an important role even in today’s multi-channel environment. Certainly, 
terrestrial radio and television stations are usually retransmitted via cable and satellite and, at least with 
respect to television, a majority of households in many countries does not actually receive these 
stations over the air. Still these licensees benefit from terrestrial distribution. Moreover, a considerable 
percentage of households continues to rely on terrestrial television distribution (e.g. 14.7% in the US 
and 42.1% in the UK).23 In radio, terrestrial distribution still dominates. Thus, it seems worthwhile to 
look into whether licensing of private broadcasting is still used to shape the media system in the digital 
era and how market entry of terrestrial and non-terrestrial broadcasting is regulated today. 
Literature Review 
While other fields of broadcasting regulation – especially public service broadcasting – receive much 
scholarly attention, this is not the case with respect to licensing of private broadcasters. The few studies 
on this topic are either limited in scope by focusing on a few empirical cases or, if comparative in 
nature, largely outdated. 
Concerning studies focused on single countries, Aslama, Hellman, and Sauri analyzed how intensified 
competition and regulatory decisions after the liberalization of the Finnish broadcasting market in 
1993 affected the diversity of programming. They argue that licensing is the strongest instrument to 
regulate the industry’s structure and should be used to stimulate “moderate competition.”24 Enli and 
Sundet discuss the renewal of two commercial Norwegian radio stations’ licenses. While their main 
focus lies on the (discursive) battle between the incumbents, the authors also offer detailed 
information about the licensing process.25 In their working paper on German broadcasting regulation, 
Schulz, Held, and Dreyer succinctly describe market entry regulation of private broadcasting and the 
authorities involved.26 Focusing on the United States, Alexander and Brown analyze how the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) promotes goals like competition, diversity, or localism by 
licensing and other regulatory measures.27 Taking a critical perspective, Streeter discusses the historical 
development of the FCC’s licensing regime and the property status of licenses. He emphasizes that 
licensing created a corporate-centered commercial broadcasting landscape whereas possible 
alternatives like amateur radio operators or non-profit broadcasters were “brushed aside or 
marginalized.”28  In his monograph on broadcasting policy in Canada, Armstrong also addresses 
                                                            
23 IP Network and RTL Group, Television 2013. International Key Facts (Paris: IP Network, 2013). 
24 Aslama, Hellman, and Sauri, 116, 129. 
25 Enli and Sundet, 709-712. 
26 Wolfgang Schulz, Thorsten Held, and Stephan Dreyer, “Regulation of Broadcasting and Internet Services in Germany: 
A Brief Overview,” working paper no. 13, Hans Bredow Institute, Mar. 2008, accessed Oct. 2, 2014, http://www.hans-
bredow-institut.de/webfm_send/124. 
27 Peter J. Alexander and Keith Brown, “Policymaking and Policy Trade-Offs: Broadcast Media Regulation in the United 
States,” in The Economic Regulation of Broadcasting Markets: Evolving Technology and the Challenges for Policy, ed. Paul Seabright 
and Jürgen von Hagen (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 255-279. 
28 Streeter, 251. 
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questions of licensing when describing the characteristics and current reforms of the Canadian 
broadcasting system.29 
Most comparative studies dealing with private broadcasting focus on the liberalization of broadcasting 
or on private broadcasting regulation in general, but do not discuss licensing in detail.30 A notable 
exception is Robillard’s monograph on regulatory bodies in 35 European countries.31 Robillard sees 
the granting of licenses as “the main function of regulatory bodies”32 and he provides an overview of 
regulatory authorities and their powers to intervene in case of infringement. While also addressing 
other regulatory issues, Barendt,33 and Lange and Woldt,34 offer comparisons of licensing processes in 
several Western countries. The latter conclude that programs transmitted via cable or satellite are 
subjected to fewer requirements than terrestrial broadcasting. The most rigorous comparative analysis 
and therefore the most suitable base for further research was conducted by Hoffmann-Riem, who 
investigated the licensing process in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States. He finds that program licenses in all six countries are granted by regulatory agencies, 
while frequencies are sometimes also awarded by governments. In case of competition for licenses, 
countries normally conduct a “beauty contest” to find the most suitable applicant. Aside from 
obligations, licenses are sometimes linked to privileges like subsidies or must-carry-obligations in cable 
networks. The countries use different sanctioning mechanisms in case of a breach of license 
conditions, but only some have implemented a systematic evaluation process.35  
Licensing in the Digital Era 
Despite advances in the digitization of broadcasting distribution, the question of whether licensing of 
private broadcasting is still used to shape the media system in the digital era has not been dealt with 
so far. While radio spectrum allocation will remain a task of government, it can be expected that 
digitization is used as an argument by policymakers and industry representatives to move away from 
sector-specific broadcasting regulation to general economic regulation.36 As discussed above, in light 
                                                            
29 Robert Armstrong, Broadcasting Policy in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010). 
30 See for example Richard Collins, Broadcasting and Audio-Visual Policy in the European Single Market (London: Libbey, 
1994); Karen Donders, Caroline Pauwels, and Jan Loisen, eds., Private Television in Western Europe: Content, Market, Policies 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Christian Potschka, Towards a Market in Broadcasting: Communications Policy in the 
UK and Germany (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Lesley Hitchens, Broadcasting Pluralism and Diversity: A 
Comparative Study of Policy and Regulation (Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2006); Dorothy Zolf, “The Regulation of 
Broadcasting in Canada and the United States: Straws in the Wind,” Canadian Journal of Communication 13 (1988): 30-44; 
Leslie Regan Shade, “Media Reform in the United States and Canada: Activism and Advocacy for Media Policies in the 
Public Interest,” in The Handbook of Global Media and Communication Policy, ed. Robin Mansell and Marc Raboy (Malden, 
MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 147-165; David Ward, ed., Television and Public Policy: Change and Continuity in an Era of Global 
Liberalization (New York: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2008); Künzler; Humphreys, Mass Media and Media Policy in 
Western Europe; Papathanassopoulos and Negrine.  
31 Robillard. 
32 Ibid., 275. 
33 Eric Barendt, Broadcasting Law. A Comparative Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 75-95. 
34 Bernd-Peter Lange and Runar Woldt, “The Results and Main Conclusion of the International Comparison,” in 
Television Requires Responsibility, ed. Bertelsmann Foundation and European Institute for the Media (Gütersloh, Germany: 
Bertelsmann Foundation, 1995), 463-502. 
35 Hoffmann-Riem. 
36 van Cuilenburg and McQuail; Levy; Gibbons and Humphreys. 
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of technological developments, policymakers often prioritize industrial policy at the expense of the 
traditional goals of media policy. For non-terrestrial stations that are free of any technological 
justification for regulation, consumer choice and information abundance are powerful narratives that 
help in portraying market entry regulation in the public interest as obsolete. Hence, licensing regimes 
could be replaced by a notification system that only requires radio and television stations to notify the 
regulator of their operation. Such “light-touch” regulation would make committing private 
broadcasters to public interest goals much more challenging. Furthermore, regulatory attention could 
move from single stations to owners of infrastructure (e.g. cable companies or multiplex operators)37 
as well as to new technological bottlenecks.38 It thus seems reasonable to expect that the traditional 
licensing of private broadcasting is called into question and that Western countries have already started 
to replace licensing regimes with notification systems, or that they generally abstain from regulation. 
Proposition 1: Due to digitization, changes in political philosophy, and related changes in the 
broadcasting market, the traditional licensing of radio and television stations will gradually 
be replaced by light-touch regulation.  
Aside from this general tendency to reform the licensing of private broadcasting, we expect differences 
between countries in relation to their licensing systems. In general, it is possible to distinguish two 
different regulatory approaches to media diversity – a competition or market approach with a strong 
preference for economic regulation to correct market failures, and an interventionist or public 
regulation approach that emphasizes socio-political goals.39 Previous research suggests that liberal 
media systems rely on a market approach, whereas particularly small democratic-corporatist media 
systems opt for a more interventionist approach.40 Accordingly, it can be expected that in small 
democratic-corporatist media systems licenses are awarded based on a beauty contest, that compliance 
with license conditions is regularly evaluated, and that licensees are guaranteed distribution of their 
stations. In contrast, in liberal media systems regulators tend to sell licenses to the highest bidder and 
to leave it up to stations to reach agreements with distributors themselves. 
Proposition 2: While small democratic-corporatist media systems tend toward an 
interventionist approach to licensing, liberal media systems rely on a market approach. 
                                                            
37 Emmanuelle Machet, “Regulatory and Licensing Models for DTT, Summary of the Answers to the Questionnaire, 
32nd EPRA Meeting, Belgrade, 6-8 October 2010 (revised version),” regulatory document EPRA/2010/13, Oct. 2013, 
accessed Oct. 3, 2014, http://epra3-
production.s3.amazonaws.com/attachments/files/817/original/DTT_summary_answers_final_revised.pdf?1323685476 
38 Corinne Schweizer, “Regulating New Bottlenecks of Digital Television Distribution: An Analysis of the Policy Making 
Process in Switzerland,” in Communication and Media Policy in the Era of Digitization and the Internet: Theories and Processes, ed. 
Maria Löblich and Senta Pfaff-Rüdiger (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos, 2013), 107-118. 
39 Andrea Grisold, “Press Concentration and Media Policy in Small Countries: Austria and Ireland Compared,” European 
Journal of Communication 11 (1996): 505; Kari Karppinen, “Media Diversity and the Politics of Criteria,” Nordicom Review 
27, no. 2 (2006): 58. 
40 Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini, Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004); Manuel Puppis and Leen d’Haenens, “Comparing Media Policy and Regulation,” in 
Handbook of Comparative Communication Research, ed. Frank Esser and Thomas Hanitzsch (London: Routledge, 2012), 221-
233. 
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METHODS 
In this study, the licensing of private media in 18 Western European and English-speaking media 
systems was compared (see Table 1 below). Such so-called simple comparisons aim at systematic 
analyses of similarities and differences and thus allow for developing classifications and typologies.41 
The selection of cases was, on the one hand, informed by Hallin & Mancini’s typology of media 
systems comparing liberal, democratic-corporatist, and polarized-pluralist countries.42 On the other 
hand, the sample includes both big and small media systems, some of the latter also featuring a so-
called giant neighbor next door.43 Accordingly, the comparison should allow us to find out whether 
characteristics of the media system and related features of media policy have any influence on the 
licensing of private broadcasting. 
 
Table 1: The media systems analyzed in this study. 
AU: Australia DK: Denmark NL: Netherlands 
AT: Austria DE: Germany NO: Norway 
BE/VG: Belgium/Flemish Community FI: Finland NZ: New Zealand 
BE/CF: Belgium/French Community FR: France SE: Sweden 
CA: Canada IE: Ireland UK: United Kingdom 
CH: Switzerland IT: Italy US: United States 
 
The comparison was based on a qualitative analysis of documents. 44  For this purpose, various 
documents that refer to licensing of private broadcasters were collected and analyzed. In a first step 
all relevant documents, including legal documents (e.g. acts, decrees, and agreements between 
governments and private broadcasters) as well as explanatory notes that accompany them, policy 
documents, and secondary literature that focuses on the current situation or reform proposals under 
discussion, were collected and critically assessed.45 Subsequently, the documents were analyzed using 
a method of deductive content categorization.46   
                                                            
41 Puppis and d’Haenens; Todd Landman, Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 
2008), 4-6; Daniele Caramani, Comparative Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 4. 
42 Hallin and Mancini. 
43 Manuel Puppis, Leen d’Haenens, Thomas Steinmaurer, and Matthias Künzler, “The European and Global Dimension: 
Taking Small Media Systems Research to the Next Level,” International Communication Gazette 71 (2009): 105-112.  
44 Nick Forster, “The Analysis of Company Documentation,” in Qualitative Methods in Organizational Research: A Practical 
Guide, ed. Catherine Cassell and Gillian Symon (London: Sage, 1994), 147-166; Jennifer Mason, Qualitative Researching 
(London: Sage, 2002), 103-119; Philipp Mayring, Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse: Grundlagen und Techniken (Weinheim, Germany: 
Beltz, 2010); David Silverman, Doing Qualitative Research: A Practical Handbook (London: Sage, 2000); David Silverman, 
Interpreting Qualitative Data. Methods for Analyzing Talk, Text and Interaction (London: Sage, 2001), 119-123. 
45 Werner Reh, “Quellen- und Dokumentenanalyse in der Politikfeldforschung: Wer steuert die Verkehrspolitik?” in 
Politikwissenschaftliche Methoden. Grundriss für Studium und Forschung, ed. Ulrich von Alemann (Opladen, Germany: 
Westdeutscher Verlag, 1995), 201-259. 
46 Mayring. 
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The category system for analyzing the licensing of private broadcasting is loosely based on the work 
of Hoffmann-Riem47 and consists of three main parts (see Table 2 below). First, the general licensing 
regime is investigated. This includes requirements to obtain a license or to notify the regulator of a 
station’s operation as well as the potential necessity to get frequencies allocated in a separate 
procedure. Second, the licensing process and conditions are inspected. This includes the authority in 
charge of awarding the license, the requirements for applications, the phases of the process, the 
selection principles employed, the privileges and obligations attached to licenses, and the term and 
renewal procedure. Third, the analysis focuses on sanctions, if any are available in the system, in case 
of breaches of license conditions and potential evaluation processes. 
 
Table 2: Categories used for document analysis. 
Licensing Regime
Licensing and Notification Requirement 
Approval of Frequencies
Licensing Process and License Conditions
Responsible Agency
Requirements for Application
Phases of Licensing Process
Selection Principle
Privileges of Licensees
Obligations of Licensees
Term & Renewal
Supervision & Evaluation
Sanctions for Breaches of License Conditions
Evaluation Mechanisms
 
RESULTS 
In this section, the results of the comparative analysis are presented. Corresponding to the categories 
developed for empirical analysis, we will first give an overview of licensing regimes before dealing with 
the process of licensing and license conditions as well as with supervision and evaluation.  
Licensing Regime 
Licensing and Notification Requirements: As in the analog past, in the majority of the analyzed 
countries private television stations need a license for digital terrestrial broadcasting. Only a few 
countries – namely Denmark, Switzerland, and the French and Flemish Communities of Belgium48  – 
have replaced the traditional licensing regime with a notification system. Accordingly, television 
                                                            
47 Hoffmann-Riem, 287-296. 
48 Switzerland is a special case. While private broadcasters only need to notify the regulator about their operation, 
licenses are still widely used because radio and TV stations benefit from certain privileges (must-carry requirements and 
subsidies) in exchange for a program remit. 
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stations distributed digitally only need to notify the regulatory agency of their operation (see Table 3 
below). 
Requirements are less rigid for non-terrestrial television stations. In the French and Flemish 
Communities of Belgium, and in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, a notification is sufficient 
for cable and satellite TV stations; whereas in Canada, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the 
United Kingdom a license is still needed. In Austria, a license is needed for satellite channels, but for 
cable channels a notification is sufficient. Only in New Zealand and the United States are neither a 
license nor a notification required.49   
 
Table 3: Licensing vs. notification requirements for TV stations. 
 Licensing Requirement Notification 
Requirement 
No Obligation 
Digital Terrestrial 
Commercial Channels 
AT, AU, CA, DE, FI, FR, 
IE, IT, NL, NO, NZ, SE, 
UK, US 
BE/VG, BE/CF, CH, DK
Digital Terrestrial Non-
Commercial Channels 
AT, AU, BE/VG (regional 
stations), BE/CF (regional 
stations), CA, DE, DK, FI, 
FR, IE, IT, NL, NO, NZ, 
SE, UK, US 
CH
Other Forms of 
Distribution  
AT (satellite), AU, CA, 
DE, FR, IE, IT, NL, UK 
AT (cable), BE/VG, 
BE/CF, CH, DK, FI, FR 
(small stations), IT 
(Internet), NO, SE 
AU (narrowcasting), NZ, 
US 
 
In contrast to television, the digital switchover has not yet taken place for terrestrial radio. Accordingly, 
analog radio stations are still in operation. While analog-terrestrial radio stations are subjected to 
licensing in all the analyzed countries, a license is usually also required for digital-terrestrial radio 
stations (mostly DAB-T). Only in Switzerland and in the French and Flemish Communities of 
Belgium do DAB-T stations not required the have a license, but they are subjected to a notification 
requirement50 (see Table 4 below). 
As with television, regulation of market entry is less strict for non-terrestrial broadcasting. In half of 
the analyzed media systems, a notification system was implemented for non-terrestrial radio stations. 
In Finland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the French and Flemish Communities of Belgium, 
notifying the regulator is sufficient for cable and satellite radio stations. In contrast, in Canada, Ireland, 
Italy, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom a license is also required for cable and satellite radio 
stations. In Austria, a license is needed for satellite radio stations whereas a notification is sufficient 
                                                            
49 Some media systems – i.e. Australia, France, and Italy – abstain from regulating market entry of certain TV stations 
(e.g. small stations or Internet TV). 
50 Norway still has a formal licensing requirement in place for DAB-T. In practice, however, it equals a notification 
system. 
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for cable radio stations. Like in the TV sector, only New Zealand and the United States do without 
licensing or notification requirements for non-terrestrial radio stations.51 
 
Table 4: Licensing vs. notification requirements for radio stations. 
 Licensing Requirement Notification 
Requirement 
No Obligation 
Analog Terrestrial 
Stations 
all 
Digital Terrestrial 
Stations 
AT, AU, CA, DE, DK, FI, 
FR, IE, IT, NL, NO, NZ, 
SE, UK, US 
BE/CF, BE/VG, CH
Other Forms of 
Distribution 
AT (satellite), AU, CA, 
DE, FR, IE, IT, NL, UK 
AT (cable), BE/CF, 
BE/VG, CH, DE 
(internet), DK, FI, FR 
(small stations), NO, SE 
AU (pay-radio, 
narrowcasting), DK 
(Internet), NZ, US 
 
Approval of Programs or Frequencies: In the majority of the analyzed countries, a license for 
terrestrial broadcasting is automatically linked to the right to distribute the program on an analog 
frequency or in a digital multiplex. However, in some countries, such so-called program licenses offer 
no guarantee for terrestrial distribution (see Table 5 below). Consequently, either an additional 
distribution license or a contract with a multiplex operator is needed. 
  
Table 5: Countries that do not guarantee terrestrial distribution. 
Additional License for Terrestrial Distribution Negotiation with Multiplex 
Operator Analog-Terrestrial Radio Stations All Terrestrial Stations
BE/VG, DK, NO BE/CF, CA, DE, FI, NL, SE BE/VG, DK, NO
 
For analog-terrestrial radio stations an additional distribution license is required in Canada, Denmark, 
Germany, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the French and Flemish Communities of 
Belgium. Keeping program licenses and the right for terrestrial distribution apart is also relevant in 
digital broadcasting. In a number of media systems a distribution license is required for digital 
terrestrial distribution, namely in Canada, Germany, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the French 
Community of Belgium. The licensing process varies considerably between media systems and is 
sometimes even more demanding than the process of getting a program license (see the Licensing Process 
and License Conditions sub-section below). In contrast, radio and television stations holding a program 
license in Austria, Denmark, Italy, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the Flemish Community of 
Belgium have to negotiate the terms of digital terrestrial distribution individually with multiplex 
                                                            
51 Australia, France, and Germany have less rigid requirements in place for small stations or Internet radio stations. 
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operators on the free market. However, in some countries (e.g. Austria and Norway) multiplex 
operators have to carry certain stations. 
Licensing Process and Licensing Conditions 
Responsibility: Government ministries and regulatory agencies are involved in the licensing of 
private broadcasters and the allocation of terrestrial frequencies (see Table 6 below). In two-thirds of 
the analyzed media systems, the regulatory agency for broadcasting is responsible for awarding licenses 
to radio and TV stations. However, in one-third of the analyzed systems, government retains the right 
to license broadcasters. Partly, we find divided responsibilities for different kinds of broadcasters: 
 In the French Community of Belgium, government is only responsible for the licensing of 
regional television stations, whereas other licenses (non-regional digital terrestrial broadcasting 
and analog radio) are awarded by the regulatory agency. 
 In Italy, government awards licenses for terrestrial and cable broadcasting, whereas the 
regulatory agency grants licenses for satellite channels. 
 In Norway, government is responsible for licensing national channels, and the regulatory 
agency is responsible for the licensing of regional channels. 
Distribution licenses for terrestrial distribution are in most cases awarded by the regulatory agency for 
either broadcasting or telecommunications. 
 
Table 6: Responsibility for awarding licenses and frequencies. 
 Government Regulatory Agency 
Program License  BE/CF (regional TV), BE/VG, 
CH, FI, IT (terrestrial & cable), 
NZ, NO (national) 
AT, AU, BE/CF (analog terrestrial 
radio, DVB-T), CA, DE, DK, FR, 
IE, IT (satellite), NL, NO (regional), 
SE, UK, US 
Distribution License CA, DK, NL BE/CF, BE/VG, DE, FI, NO, SE 
 
Requirements for Application: Applicants for licenses usually have to fulfill certain requirements. 
First, they often have to prove their financial and/or technical ability to operate a radio or TV station. 
In Austria, Norway, and the United Kingdom, applicants have to show a contract with a multiplex 
operator assuring terrestrial distribution. Second, applicants in most media systems have to be 
independent from political organizations. Third, the number of licenses that can be awarded to an 
applicant or the maximum audience market share that a single company is allowed to gain are often 
limited in order to prevent ownership concentration. Austria, Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, 
New Zealand, Switzerland, and the United States have implemented such barriers. 
Phases of the Licensing Process: Generally, applicants have to submit a written application 
containing information about ownership and the planned programming as well as proving compliance 
with the above-mentioned requirements. However, there are differences as to when applications can 
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be submitted. While licenses for terrestrial broadcasting are mostly announced by a call for tender, 
applications for the licensing of non-terrestrial stations can usually be submitted at any time (see Table 
7 below). Only in Canada, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands can applications for all types of licenses 
be submitted continuously. 
The responsible bodies proceed with a simple check of legal requirements before awarding licenses – 
at least when there is no competition for a certain license. In several countries – namely Canada, 
France, Switzerland, and the United States – authorities can organize a hearing or conduct a 
consultation to assess applications. In Austria, ministries of the Länder can state their opinion if radio 
stations in their area apply for licenses. 
The two different proceedings are also found in the approval of terrestrial frequencies. In general, 
stations can apply for a distribution license as soon as they are granted a program license. However, 
in Germany and the French Community of Belgium, frequencies are announced by a separate call for 
tender. 
 
Table 7: Tendering of licenses and frequencies. 
 Call for Tender Continuous Application 
Program Licenses  AT (AR), AU (terrestrial), 
BE/CF (AR), BE/VG (AR), 
CH, DK, FI, FR (terrestrial), IE 
(AR), NO (AR), SE (terrestrial 
radio), UK (AR, local DVB-T), 
NZ, US 
AT (digital terrestrial and satellite), 
AU (cable, satellite & Internet), CA, 
DE, FR (non-terrestrial), IE (cable 
and satellite), IT, NL, NO (digital 
terrestrial), SE (DVB-T), UK (digital 
terrestrial, cable and satellite) 
Distribution License BE/CF, DE FI, NL, BE/VG; CA, DK, NO, SE
 Note: AR = analog-terrestrial radio. 
 
Selection Principle: As just mentioned, licenses are usually granted when all the predefined legal 
requirements are met. However, in case of competition for licenses (and frequencies), the responsible 
agency or ministry has to select among applicants. Two different systems of selection can be 
distinguished: auctions and beauty contests (see Table 8 below). In the majority of analyzed media 
systems, licenses are awarded using a so-called beauty contest that evaluates applications in light of 
their fulfilment of license conditions. Often-used criteria include the plurality of programming and 
providers, program concepts, the willingness to produce programs locally, solid funding, or the 
experience of the applicant. In some countries auctions are held to sell licenses to the highest bidder. 
While in Denmark and Sweden auctions are used for analog-terrestrial radio licenses, in Australia, 
New Zealand, and the United States licenses for commercial stations are sold to the highest bidder. 
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Table 8: Selection principle in case of competition. 
 Auction Beauty Contest
Program Licenses  AU (commercial free-to-air), 
DK (AR), NZ (commercial 
free-to-air), SE (AR), 
US (commercial) 
AT (AR), AU (non-commercial), 
BE/CF, BE/VG, CA, CH, DK 
(digital terrestrial), FI, FR, IE (AR), 
NO (AR), NZ, (non-commercial), 
SE (digital terrestrial), UK, (AR, 
local DVB-T), US (non-commercial)
Distribution License NL BE/CF, NL, DE, FI 
 Note: AR = analog-terrestrial radio. 
 
Privileges of Licensees: Licenses are often linked to privileges (see Table 9 below). The most 
common privilege is a must-carry obligation for cable distribution. While in Switzerland and the 
United States all licensed stations have to be distributed via cable, in other countries must-carry rules 
are only coupled to certain stations (e.g. local stations or non-commercial stations). 
 
Table 9: Privileges linked to licenses. 
Must-Carry for 
Cable Distribution 
All channels CH, US 
Specific channels AT, BE/CF, BE/VG, CA, DE, FI, IE, SE 
Subsidies BE/VG, BE/CF, CA, CH, DK 
 
A less-common privilege is the subsidization of licensed broadcasters. Stations can either apply for 
subsidies, or receive a slice of the license fee for public service broadcasters: 
 In Canada, campus or community radio stations may receive support from the Community 
Radio Fund of Canada; until recently local television states in rural areas could benefit from 
the Local Programming Improvement Fund.52   
 In the French and Flemish communities of Belgium, regional TV stations can receive 
production aid.  
 Non-commercial terrestrial broadcasters in Denmark can apply for subsidies (TV) or receive 
a slice of license fee revenues (radio).  
 In Switzerland, radio and TV licenses for local broadcasters are coupled to a share of license 
fee revenues. 
                                                            
52 After a public hearing, the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission decided to phase out this 
fund on September 1, 2014. The fund, which was created in 2008 in order to support broadcasters in a difficult financial 
period, is argued to have fulfilled its purpose. Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, 
“Discontinuing the Local Program Improvement Fund (LPIF),” press release, Mar. 21, 2014, accessed Oct. 4, 2014, 
http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/info_sht/tv13.htm. 
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Obligations of Licensees: In many countries licenses come not only with privileges but also with 
obligations. These can concern either the organization of the licensed broadcasters or the program 
content: 
 On the organizational level stations can be committed to adopt an editorial charter (Austria, 
Switzerland, and the French and Flemish Communities of Belgium) or to become a member 
of the press council (French Community of Belgium). Furthermore, requirements for the 
composition of the board of directors may exist (e.g. for regional TV stations in the French 
and Flemish Communities of Belgium).  
 On the content level, radio and TV stations can be obliged to transmit a program for a 
minimum number of hours per day (e.g. in Austria, Finland, France, New Zealand, and 
Norway); to broadcast local content about the license area and/or to produce their content 
locally (e.g. in Australia, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom, and the Flemish Community of Belgium). Non-commercial stations are often 
forbidden to air advertising (e.g. in Denmark, Switzerland, United Kingdom). 
Term and Renewal of Licenses: In most cases licenses are valid for five to twelve years (see Table 
10 below). While in most countries the same duration applies to all types of licenses, in other countries 
the term for which a license is awarded varies. 
 
Table 10: Term of license. 
5 years 6 years 7 years 8 years 9 years 10 years 12 years No term or 
variable 
term 
AU, DK, 
FR (AR), 
NL 
IT (AR, 
DVB-S),  
NO (AR) SE (DAB-
T, AR), US 
BE/CF, 
BE/VG 
AT, CH, FI, 
FR, NZ 
(AR) 
IT (DVB-T, 
DAB-T), 
UK (cable 
and satellite 
radio, local 
DVB-T) 
CA, IE, 
NZ, UK 
Note: AR = analog-terrestrial radio. 
 
Half of the analyzed media systems (Australia, Canada, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Flemish Community of Belgium) have 
implemented a simplified procedure for the renewal of licenses. In Ireland for instance, such a 
simplified procedure is conducted if the incumbent is the only applicant for the license in question. In 
France, licenses can be renewed up to two times without announcement if the incumbent has not 
violated the license conditions and is able to reach an agreement with the regulatory agency. 
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Supervision and Evaluation 
Sanctions for Breaches of License Conditions: A variety of sanctions exist in case of non-
compliance with license conditions. The most common sanctions are fines and the revocation of the 
license (see Table 11 below). Most regulators also make use of official letters to stations that are in 
breach of conditions and have the option to order temporary suspension of operation. In some media 
systems, radio and TV stations are obligated to air a reprimand in their own programming or to pay 
for the publication of a reprimand in the local newspaper.  
 
Table 11: Sanctions in case of infringements. 
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AT X X X     X 
AU X X    X  X 
BE/CF X X X X X X  X 
BE/VG X X X X  X  X 
CA  X    X  X 
CH X X    X  X 
DE X X   X   X 
DK  X    X  X 
FI  X      X 
FR X X X  X X  X 
IE  X    X  X 
IT  X    X  X 
NL  X      X 
NO X X    X  X 
NZ X X      X 
SE  X      X 
UK  X X   X X X 
US X x      X 
 
Evaluation Mechanisms: Compliance with license conditions is evaluated only partly: 
 In some media systems, licensed broadcasters have to report on the fulfillment of their 
program remit. This is the case in the French Community of Belgium (for analog terrestrial 
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radio and TV stations), New Zealand (for non-commercial channels and local terrestrial radio), 
Norway (local analog-terrestrial radio), and the United Kingdom (for all licensed stations).  
 In Switzerland, licensed local broadcasters must not only commission regular evaluations of 
their organization (the results of which are then discussed with the regulator) but their 
programs are also analyzed by communication scholars on behalf of the regulator. 
  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this article we set out to examine the licensing of private broadcasting in 18 Western European and 
English-speaking media systems. Due to digitization and related market developments that have 
brought about a myriad of radio and television stations available to viewers and listeners, policymakers 
are increasingly forced to scrutinize the meaningfulness of traditional market entry regulation for 
private broadcasting. Yet up-to-date comparative research that analyzes the repercussions of 
digitization for the licensing of broadcasting is missing. Given that licenses are an important 
instrument for committing broadcasters to public interest objectives, we ask whether licensing of 
private broadcasting is still used to shape the media system in the digital era or whether licensing is 
just an irrelevant blast from the past. 
Given the increasing reach of digital terrestrial broadcasting, we first proposed that traditional 
licensing regimes are being replaced by light-touch regulation, such as a requirement for notification. 
However, the results indicate that despite digitization, most countries still rely heavily on licensing 
regimes in order to shape their media systems. With a few exceptions, not only analog-terrestrial radio 
stations but also digital-terrestrial TV and radio stations require licenses. Such licenses are still used to 
shape the media system in the public interest. This is done for instance through application 
requirements (independence from political organizations, limitations on the number of licenses to be 
held by a single owner), the formulation of license conditions (e.g. production and transmission of 
local content), as well as elaborate beauty contests for awarding licenses to the applicant that best 
meets these conditions. 
Provisions for non-terrestrial broadcasting (e.g. satellite and cable channels) are less rigid. In half of 
the analyzed media systems it is sufficient for radio and TV stations to notify the regulator about their 
operation. And while half of the analyzed media systems still award licenses to such channels, in the 
absence of competition most bodies responsible for licensing leave it at a simple check of legal 
requirements before awarding licenses. Accordingly, Proposition 1 (see above) is only partly 
supported. Whereas regulators are indeed mostly relying on light-touch regulation with notification 
requirements or formal checks only for non-terrestrial broadcasting, terrestrial radio and TV stations 
are still required to have licenses in most cases and thus are subject to regulation in the public interest. 
Based on previous research into the relations between media systems and media regulation,53 we 
secondly proposed that small democratic-corporatist media systems are more prone to an 
                                                            
53 Hallin and Mancini; Manuel, d’Haenens, Steinmaurer, and Künzler. 
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interventionist approach to licensing whereas liberal media systems rely on a market approach. Results 
are, however, not as clear-cut. They still provide some support for Proposition 2 (see above). To begin 
with, auctions to sell licenses to the highest bidder are less common in small democratic-corporatist 
media systems than in liberal media systems. Small democratic-corporatist media systems mostly rely 
on beauty contests to select which applicant should be awarded a license. Moreover, a simplified 
renewal for expiring licenses is found in all analyzed liberal media systems but only in a few of the 
democratic-corporatist countries.  
However, the results unexpectedly indicate that especially large media systems like Germany, France, 
Italy, and the United Kingdom still rely on licensing regimes for all forms of distribution. In contrast, 
the Belgian Communities, Denmark, and Switzerland make do with notification-only systems for 
digital-terrestrial radio and/or television stations as well as for non-terrestrial forms of distribution. 
Hence it becomes clear that licensing practices do not simply correspond to Hallin and Mancini’s three 
models of media systems. Scholars criticize that the attribution of countries to certain models is not 
always adequate, and they highlight the relative neglect of some system-differentiating factors. For 
instance, the path-dependency of countries’ media systems and regulation is stressed from the 
perspective of historical institutionalism, pointing to a range of salient political, legal, and economic 
variables that ultimately also bear on market entry regulation in broadcasting.54   
Digitization and connected social and economic developments challenge the traditional regulation of 
broadcasting markets. Therefore, market entry regulation by way of licensing private broadcasting 
could be assumed to be a blast from the past. However, the results indicate that licensing is still used 
as an instrument to shape media systems in the public interest and to commit private broadcasters to 
societal objectives in most countries. Digitization alone does not determine a renunciation of 
traditional broadcasting regulation. Instead, the political will to reform seems to be equally important. 
Furthermore, the comparison of 18 Western media systems shows a wide variety of policy options for 
the design of licensing regimes and processes. Such knowledge is not only of scholarly interest but 
could also be useful for policymakers when scrutinizing the suitability of their current licensing regime. 
While technological developments are about to eliminate one of the traditional justifications for 
licensing, market entry regulation proves to remain a meaningful possibility for shaping the media 
system in the public interest – even in the digital era. 
 
  
                                                            
54 Peter Humphreys, “A Political Scientist’s Contribution to the Comparative Study of Media Systems in Europe: A 
Response to Hallin and Mancini,” in Trends in Communication Policy Research: New Theories, Methods and Subjects, ed. Natascha 
Just and Manuel Puppis (Chicago: Intellect, 2012), 157-176; Jonathan Hardy, “Comparing Media Systems,” in The 
Handbook of Comparative Communication Research, ed. Frank Esser and Thomas Hanitzsch (New York: Routledge, 2012), 
185-206. 
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